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Historical Commentary

Vietnam and Revisionism
David Culver
American Colonel Summers: "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield."
North Vietnamese Colonel Tu: "That may be so but it is also irrelevant."
Conversation in Hanoi, April 1975

st year General William Westmoreland told a Boston College
udience that politicians caused
America's defeat in Vietnam. "The
Vietnam War was not lost on the
battlefield," the Commander of
United States forces in Vietnam said,
"but lost in the halls of Congress."
Westmoreland's charge reflects recent Vietnam War revisionism, the
effort to rationalize America's defeat
by claiming that United States forces
were prevented from winning. Besides
the politicians, who reduced military
spending, the revisionists' cast of villains includes the media and antiwar
dissenters, who turned the nation
against the war, and various Presidents,
who restricted military operations.
If polls are to be believed, these
interpretations are widely held by
Americans, especially Vietnam veterans. President Ronald Reagan subscribes to this view. Shortly after his
election in 1980, he declared that
American troops "were denied permission to win." Revisionism is reflected in our popular culture, reaching
its most extreme form in the film
Rambo, which has its macho superhero
ask his superior, "Do we get to win this
time?"
That such interpretations strike a
responsive chord is understandable.
"The war that went wrong" has been a
painful and traumatic episode for
Americans accustomed to military victory. The cheering for Rambo reflects
the need of many to resurrect a measure of national honor lost in the war.
Revisionism salves the national psyche
and restores a self-image of power.
However comforting, though, revisionism is simplistic and is narrowly focused. It ignores both the strength of
Vietnamese nationalism and the weakness of our client state, South Vietnam,
historical factors which go far to explain the outcome of the war. But to
understand better this lack of historical
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perspective, a brief review of American
involvement in Vietnam is in order.
As nearly everyone knows, America's longest and most unpopular war
had its origins in the Cold War and the
containment of communism that developed in the wake of World War II. As
the Soviet Union tightened its grip on
Eastern Europe, an alarmed President
Harry Truman in 1947 committed the
American government to combating
Soviet expansion in Europe. The Cold
War was official, and containment -the effort to limit communism to the
frontiers already under Soviet control
-- became America's principal Cold
War strategy.
But by the end of the decade, the
United States seemed less secure, communism more threatening. In 1949 the
communists triumphed in China and
the Russians acquired the bomb. At
home a Red Scare was under way,
distorting public debate and foreign
policy. Soon led by Senator Joseph
McCarthy, conservatives vilified the
Truman Administration for being soft
on communism and for "losing"
China. Washington was in near-panic

when it decided to extend containment
to Vietnam by openly supporting
France in its war in Indochina.
The First (or French) Indochina
War (1946-54) erupted when France
tried to reestablish its empire in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia)
after World War II. Meanwhile, however, in 1945 Ho Chi Minh, a communist and nationalist, had declared
the independence of Vietnam and soon
war broke out between the French and
the Vietminh, a coalition of nationalist
groups led by the communists. By late
1949, however, with the war going
badly, France appealed for American
aid. In the wake of China's fall,
Washington, feeling bound to bolster
an important ally whose support the
United States needed in Europe, acceded to French demands, and in early
1950 took the first step toward a
25-year-war.
This decision to extend containment
to Vietnam was part of a new American
strategy to counter communist aggression anywhere in the world. "The
assault on free institutions is worldwide," a 1950 National Security Coun-

cil report noted ominously. The war in
Vietnam (and soon Korea) was seen as
part of "the Kremlin's design for world
domination." Communism, Washington believed, was monolithic, and communists like Ho were merely pawns of
Moscow in a single conspiracy for
world power. With China gone, Indochina was the next communist target,
and should this region fall, then the
surrounding countries (Malaya, Burma, Thailand) would fall like a row of
dominoes.
In retrospect, historians question
the American assumption that Ho was
an agent of Moscow, that Vietnam was
a Soviet proxy. Ho was a dedicated
communist, but he was also a nationalist, who resisted subservience to both
the Soviet Union and China. Ho's
drive for power was indigenous and
was not initiated by Moscow. Indeed, it
was part of a nationalist movement that
was sweeping Asia, a powerful historical phenomenon not fully appreciated
by American policy makers, nor more
recently by revisionists. As George
Herring, the author of a major study of
the Vietnam War concludes, "Regardless of his ideology, Ho by 1950 had
captured the standard of Vietnamese
nationalism, and by supporting France,
... the United States was attaching itself
to a losing cause." With the colonial
era over, then, the United States chose
the wrong side of history.
The Vietnam policies developed by
the Truman Administration were continued by President Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61). American aid to
France grew steadily (by 1954 America
was paying for 78% of the cost of the
war), but it could not prevent a French
defeat. The climax came in early 1954
when the Vietminh surrounded a large
French force at Dienbienphu. American military intervention was seriously
considered, but rejected by the Eisenhower Administration, and the French
force surrendered.
At a conference in Geneva, meanwhile, the future of Indochina was
being hammered out at the expense of
France. The resulting Geneva Accords
of 1954 (which the United States never
signed) provided for a military ceasefire, French withdrawal from North
Vietnam, and a temporary partition of

Vietnam pending elections scheduled
for 1956.
While highly critical of the French
for any compromise with communism,
the United States moved to establish
South Vietnam as a barrier to further
communist advances in Southeast
Asia. Containment would consist of
restricting communism to North Vietnam and treating South Vietnam as an
independent country and part of the
"free" world.
Despite the French failure and
strong warnings of the difficulties of
nation-building, the United States
pushed the French aside and moved
quickly to prop up the regime of Ngo
Dinh Diem. A nationalist and strong
anti-communist, Diem clearly illustrated the enormous task in establishing South Vietnam as the "cornerstone
of the Free world in Southeast Asia."
He was a Catholic elitist in a Buddist
land, who had many enemies and little
popular support. He lacked Ho's reputation, charisma, and vision for the
future of Vietnam. The weakness of
Diem (and of all South Vietnamese
governments) was an intractable problem that would plague American policy
to the end and, the revisionists notwithstanding, would have much to do
with the war's conclusions.
With American support, Diem consolidated his rule and cancelled the
national elections called for by the
Geneva Accords. Soon, however, he
faced a revolt. The Vietcong, Diem's
pejorative term for Vietnamese communists, began a struggle to achieve
what they believed had been denied
them when Diem cancelled the elections. By the time Eisenhower left
office in early 1961, the insurgency,
fed by Diem's unpopularity and increasing support from the North, had
grown into a formidable movement.
Eisenhower's successor, John F.
Kennedy (1961-63), became the third
president to try to contain communism
in Southeast Asia. Convinced that the
struggle there was a test of American
resolve, Kennedy was determined not
to "lose" Vietnam to communism (no
one could ever forget the pounding the
Truman Administration took for
"losing" China), and so increased the
number of American military advisors

to 16,500. But Washington could not
provide political stability in Saigon or
transform Diem into "the Winston
Churchill of Southeast Asia," as Vice
President Lyndon Johnson publicly
hailed him. (Privately, the crude Texan
was more candid: "Shit, man, he's the
only boy we got there.") By 1963,
when it was clear that Diem was losing
the war, the Kennedy Administration
approved of a coup against Diem, who
was subsequently murdered.
In three weeks Kennedy himself was
dead. The new President, Lyndon
Johnson, inherited a deteriorating situation, despite Diem's elimination. Convinced that American honor, security,
and prestige were at stake, Johnson
moved to prevent a communist
victory.
Following his election in 1964,
Johnson began the fateful military
involvement. Selective air strikes in
February 1965 were followed three
weeks later by the massive bombing of
North Vietnam and, soon after, by the
decision to use American soldiers in
battle. By the summer of 1965, the
United States was fighting a major
undeclared war in Vietnam.
The Johnson Administration believed that a few Marines would be a
quick fix, but the war now acquired a
life of its own. American escalation was
matched by Hanoi with support from
China and the Soviet Union. What a
frustrated President Johnson exclaimed in 1965 applied to any year of
the war: "I can't get out. I can't finish it
with what I got. So what the hell can I
do?" The answer was more of the same,
hoping that a few more troops
(550,000 by 1968) or a little more
bombing would break the communists' will to fight.
But despite government claims that
victory was "around the corner," the
United States was losing the war. As if
to underscore this, the communists· in
January 1968 launched the Tet Offensive, a massive attack throughout the
south. The communists suffered heavy
losses, but not before Americans
watched in living color as the Vietcong
attacked the American Embassy in
Saigon. Tet's psychological effect was
devastating and public opinion turned
sharply against the war.
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Bob Englehart, Hartford Courant

Tet also claimed a political victim.
Two months after Tet, President Johnson told a national TV audience he
would not run for reelection. He had
tried to fight a limited war, quickly,
cheaply, and seemed baffled by an
enemy that was willing to take such
losses and continue to fight. "J ust look
at the figures and you'll see that they
have failed," Johnson said. "Ho's people are just not telling him about his
losses." In 1946 Ho had declared, "kill
ten of our men and we will kill one of
yours. In the end, you will lose and I
will win." He was speaking to the
French, but the equation applied no
less to the Americans. North Vietnam,
willing and able to fight longer, would
outlast the United States.
If the war forced Johnson from the
White House, it helped elect Richard
Nixon (1969-74), who was determined to end the war but not lose it.
His goal was to preserve South Vietnam as a non-communist state, and his
strategy was "Vietnamization" -- turn
the fighting over to the South Vietnamese, while withdrawing American
troops. To compel Hanoi to make
concessions, Nixon intensified the
bombing of the North, declaring that
"the bastards have never been bombed
like they're going to be bombed this
time." As Henry Kissinger, Nixon's
National Security Adviser insisted, a
"fourth-rate power like North Vietnam" must have a "breaking point."
But no matter how much the United
States pulverized the North, it could
not force the communists to quit.
Hanoi had sacrificed too much and was
too close to victory. The war dragged
on for four more years before the Paris
Accords were finally signed in January
1973. But the "peace agreements,"
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which provided for a cease-fire and the
withdrawal of American troops, did
not resolve the political future of
South Vietnam, the central issue of the
war. The war soon resumed, and in
April 1975 the communists marched
triumphantly into Saigon, drawing the
painful war to a close. 58,000 Americans had died. Twenty-five years of
effort had ended in failure.
Americans barely noticed South
Vietnam's collapse, preferring to put
the disaster out of their minds. The
nation was spared a bitter witch hunt in
search of those who "lost Vietnam."
No one seemed to want to know. But
the war still haunts the American memory and colors United States foreign
policy. The so-called "Vietnam syndrome" has inhibited the United States
abroad. "Will Nicaragua be another
Vietnam?" is the subject of debate and
cover stories. Thus the question returns to why we lost and the "lessons"
of the war. The question is not just
academic; it bears on the issue of
American power in the world and
under what circumstances the United
States should again send troops to fight
abroad.
Though questions persist and a consensus on the war is still emerging, the
revisionists' claim that the defeat was
largely self-inflicted is a dubious proposition. Congress, to return to Westmoreland's charge, continued to vote
funds well after the public had turned
irreversibly against the war. The media,
too, reflected, rather than shaped, public opinion. As George Herring has
recently written, "Careful research has
shown that ... the media and the antiwar movement played no more than
peripheral roles in turning the nation
against the war."

As for the charge that the military
was handcuffed by civilian leaders, the
United States could have bombed
North Vietnam back to the Stone Age
and invaded the North. But would the
public have supported a costly invasion against a dedicated foe that would
have risked war with China and the
Soviet Union (China had threatened to
respond if the United States had
moved north). In any case, what would
have been left after "Victory?" As Senator Stuart Symington asked of Secretary of State Dean Rusk: "What do we
win if we win?" At the least, it would
have meant an indefinite American
occupation of Vietnam with all its
costs and strains.
Revisionism also underestimates the
power of Vietnamese nationalism,
whose banner had been captured by
Ho and whose goal was to rid Vietnam
of foreigners. Secretary Rusk said after
the war that he had made two mistakes:
underestimating the enemy and overestimating the patience of the American people. Rusk's assessment of the
determiniation, even fanaticism, of the
enemy, was correct, but he was wrong
about the American public. Sentiment
turned against the war because the
American government could not persuade its citizens that South Vietnam
was vital to our survival and that the
war had any chance of success. In the
end the public recognized that the
American goal of propping up South
Vietnam was unachievable. Our client
state, flabby and corrupt, could not
provide the cohesion or stability to
become a viable anti-communist state.
And no amount of American aid could
change that.
Colonel Summers was correct.
American soldiers fought bravely and
won the battles. But as Colonel Tu
said, it was irrelevant. Vietnam required a political solution; America
tried to impose a military solution.
Despite all its might, the United States
could not impose its will. While Americans discuss the lessons of the war, they
seem to recognize one chastening lesson: there are limits to American
power in a highly complex world.
David Culver is a Professor of History at
Bridgewater State College.

